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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
Theories of learning have been the backbone of
psychological research and theory construction since
psychology's scientific beginnings.

An understanding of how

human beings learn is fundamental to understanding human
beings at all.

From the 1930s through the 1950s, perhaps

the heyday of learning theory development and research,
psychologists endeavored to create "global" or "grand"
theories that could explain all aspects of the learning
process.

Skeptical that any one theory could explain

completely the nature of the learning process, psychologists
since the 1960s have tended to focus on specific aspects of
the learning process.

Behavioristic theories such as

classical conditioning or reinforcement theories, as well as
the numerous cognitive theories, have each at one time or
another enjoyed a considerable amount of empirical
attention.

Currently, even while various cognitive theories

continue to develop, the more traditional behavioristic
theories are enjoying a comeback in psychological research
(Klein and Mowrer, 1989).
A careful reading of both past and present theories of
learning reveals that most of them assume a mediation model
of cognition in which various cognitive mechanisms mediate
between environmental stimuli and behavioral responses.
1

In

2

this thesis, however, we would like to put forth a theory of
learning, perhaps in the spirit of grand theories, that
derives from a predicational (after Rychlak, l988b) model of
cognition rather than a mediational model.

A predicational

model of learning is an alternative theoretical explanation
based on the assumption that people as agents actively endow
their world with meaning.

The predicational process of

learning is neither mechanistic nor mediated; it is a
process that requires an active (as opposed to passive)
contribution on the part of an individual in order for
learning to take place.

The fundamental nature of the

predicational process is dialectical.

That is, learning is

process by which meanings are grasped in terms of, at the
vary least, their opposites.

Opposites provide clarity and

a delimitating context within which the contents of the
predicational process can be framed.

This is by no means

the only way in which dialectics has been understood.

The

term "dialectical'' has a long philosophical history, with
many different meanings.

For the purposes of this thesis we

will ref er to the dialectical aspect of the predicational
process as oppositionality.
To be sure, there is a growing body of research that
suggests that there is a dialectical or oppositional feature
to cognition.

In Chapter I of this thesis, we will provide

a theoretical backdrop from which to understand the current
research on oppositionality--itself a form of the

3

predicational process.

Chapter II will include a review of

past research that shows oppositionality to be an important
aspect of the learning process.

The primary purpose of this

thesis is to add to that body of research by reporting on
three experiments that were designed to demonstrate the
importance of oppositionality during learning.
Specifically, the experiments conducted for this thesis were
designed to investigate directly a) the extent to which
oppositional meanings are salient in learning and memory
tasks, and b) whether oppositional meanings (as opposed to
non-oppositional meanings) can actually enhance learning and
memory abilities.

CHAPTER I I
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF OPPOSITIONALITY

In this chapter the theoretical foundations for the
research reported in this thesis are laid down.

A brief

discussion of importance of theory in research is followed
by an discussion of Logical Learning Theory (LLT) , the
theory of interest.

The final pages of this chapter define

and explicate--via dialectical meaning--the particular
theoretical construct of interest within this theory:

oppositionality.

Theor_y
For the past forty years or so, historians and
philosophers of science have reminded us of the preeminent
role that theory plays in scientific inquiry (e.g., Kuhn,
1970; Popper, 1959; Marx, 1951).

Theories, whether formal

or informal, give expression to any given fact pattern.

The

positivistic notion that the "facts speak for themselves,"
that they are somehow independent of theory, has given way
to a more modest notion that for any given fact pattern
there are, in principle, an infinite number of explanations.
Even more fundamental than simply recognizing that the same
fact pattern may have multiple interpretations is the
realization that in order for facts to be facts at all--that
is, facts for a community of scientists--they need a
4
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language of description, and any given language necessarily
carries with it implicit (if not explicit) assumptive
categories.

Since assumptions are inextricably joined to

theory, at one level or another, it follows that articulated
facts are theory-laden.
scientism

1

Moreover, contemporary criticism of

reminds us that observations, from which facts

are derived, are themselves theory-laden, dependent upon the
pre-understanding (or assumptions or framework) of the
observer.

This becomes a critical point as scientists

construct a body of scientific knowledge.

Understanding the

pre-understanding or assumptive framework of the observer
(or scientist) becomes a crucial factor in understanding a
body of empirical research that is being offered up by an
observer or a community of observers.
Given these assertions about the importance of theory,
those who hold to such assertions would see theory
construction, explication and criticism as perhaps the most
crucial tasks of the scientist.

2

On this account the

1

-According to Bleicher (1982, p.14) the term "scientism"
refers to a particular brand of science that includes the
following tenets:
a) science deals with "facts" given independently of the
researcher
b) the empirical-analytical method is the only valid mode of
knowledge-acquisition:
c) that this method should be extended to all spheres of
cognitive activity
d) that its results are the only true form of knowledge
2

-Recently there is has been call for psychologists to
take the task of theory construction and criticism in a
rigorous way (see Kukla, 1989).

6

ubiquitous aphorism usually attributed to Kurt Lewin that
"there is nothing so practical as a good theory" might be
better stated as ''there is nothing so essential as good
theory."

Nevertheless, while these epistemological

considerations are crucially fundamental

3

,

theory qua

theory continues to play an important practical role in
scientific inquiry.
Rychlak (1981, Chapter III), for example, has
considered the role of theory in psychology and has outlined
four general functions: First, theory serves a descriptive
function in that it gives an accounting of the nature of
human phenomena (p.45).

This function brings together

statements, categories, or propositional relationships that
describe, at one level of abstraction or another, the sum
total of a given phenomenon or phenomena.

Theoretical

descriptions make explicit the pre-understanding or
assumptive categories of theorists.

Theory also functions

to delimit or set bounds on the scope of constructs or
propositions (p.49).

Delimiting theoretical constructs or

propositions allows for theories to be cogent, meaningful
and explanatorily powerful.

3

Without this delimiting

-obviously, epistemological considerations of science,
knowledge and observation are the stuff whole theses and books
are made of.
It is not my intention to go into any further
detail concerning this important area. For detailed analysis
of these issues see Bleicher (1982), Faulconer and Williams
(1985), Feyerabend (1975), Kuhn (1970), Lakatos and Musgrave
(1970), Manicus and Secord (1983) Polkinghorne (1983); Rychlak
(1985), Shames (1990) and Suppe (1977).
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function theoretical constructs or propositions can address
many different phenomena but the relationship between them
will be conflated or unclear.

Theories that delimit are

able to escape the philosophical truism that "that which
explains everything explains nothing."

Theory also serves a

generative function in providing the germ from which further
thought and research can be nourished (p.54).

Theory should

be used as a heuristic that generates insights, speculation
or explanation about the nature of a given phenomenon.
Finally, as implied in the other functions, theory serves an
integrative function (p.65); it brings together theoretical
constructs into a consistent unified whole.

At the very

least, formal theories should reflect this integrative
quality.
It might be maintained that a good theory should
reflect all four of these functions.

Even while it can be

argued that theories which may be lacking in one or more of
these functions are still good theories, the four functions
do serve as a useful framework from which to examine the
merits of a given theory.

Moreover, it seems reasonable to

suggest that the staying power of a theory may depend on its
ability to carry out these fundamental functions.
The present research for this thesis is directly tied
to a theory.

Given the preceding discussion about the

importance and function of theory, what follows will include
a brief explication of the theory of interest--via this

8

chapter and a literature review--as well as a presentation
of empirical findings designed to investigate important
constructs contained within the theory.

Logical Learning Theory
Rychlak's (1988) "Logical Learning Theory" (LLT) serves
as the rationale for the research reported on in this
thesis.

It is a teleological, humanistic approach to human

phenomena.

According to this theory, individuals as agents

are capable of making a contribution to their own cognitions
and behaviors.

That is, human beings are able to act "for

the sake of which," instead of merely being acted upon by
external or internal (biological) forces.

Human freedom or

agency is a fundamental concern of LLT (Rychlak, 1988,
1981) .
Since there are many definitions of and perspectives
about freedom or agency which are in constant state of flux,
and since any discussion of freedom can become easily
conflated, it is important to be explicit about the kind of
freedom LLT seeks to address.

Logical learning theory is

not concerned with physical or political freedom.

Often

questions of political liberty and rights or physical
confinement in one form or another are confused with what
has been called freedom of the will or agency.
latter concept that LLT concerns itself with.

It is the
Logical

learning theory is strictly a psychological theory,

9

concerning itself with such psychological processes as
wishes, decisions, intentions, desires, motivations and
individual responsibility for such cognitive processes. 4
At first glance, theories that concern themselves with
human agency seem neither original nor productive given the
long-standing, notoriously complicated debates that span the
philosophical history of Western civilization.

Moreover,

because of the reductio-mechanistic tendencies of modern
psychological inquiry, the notion of agency is usually
ignored, lost, or denied.

5

By and large, most theories of

human behavior are deterministic in the same sense that
Newtonian physics is deterministic.

Indeed, most models of

human behavior are, by now in an "unconscious" way,
patterned after the model of a superseded physics (Leahey,
1987, pp.3-33; Polkinghorne, 1983, Chapter 2; Robinson,
1981, Chapters 10 & 11; Rychlak, 1979, Chapter 2, 1981,
Chapter V) .

Since efficient-cause forces rather than

freedom are the central concern of psychology, the question
of human beings qua agents is either assumed, ignored or
4

-see Thorp (1980, pp.3-16) for a brief but informative
explication of the varieties of psychological freedom. For a
more detailed analysis and critique of psychological freedom
as defined here, see Strawson (1986).
5

-For example, Skinner (1971) suggests that "man's
struggle for freedom in not due to a will to be free, but to
certain behavioral processes characteristic of the human
organism, the chief effect of which is the avoidance of or
escape from so-called aversive features of the environment
(p.42) ."
Our "feeling" free is an illusion because,
ultimately,
"freedom is a matter of contingencies of
reinforcement . . . " (p. 37).

10

thought to be too theoretically and methodologically messy.
But as some psychologists have argued (e.g., Gauld and
shotter, 1979; Rychlak, 1988, 1979; Taylor, 1985; Williams,
1987), unless psychology can account for human activity in
terms of agency, in terms of genuine (not simply apparent)
possibility and responsibility, human activity in all of its
variety will necessarily lose any semblance of
meaningfulness.

As Williams (1987, p.211) has argued, the

meaningfulness of human action resides "in its possibilities
and its alternatives, its meaningful network of ends and
distinctions.''

To borrow an example from Williams, an act

of love is meaningful if it is distinguished from acts of
hate, envy or mistrust and if it is understood that it need
not happen.
Meaningful acts are meaningful because an actor could
have acted differently or not acted at all.

If acts of love

or hate or a variety of other human activities were to be
understood fundamentally as efficiently caused necessity,
those acts could only be understood as unintelligible and
therefore absurd; and any semblance of meaningfulness
attached to such acts must be viewed as illusory.

Since as

psychologists and human beings we take our actions and the
actions of others to be meaningful, it in incumbent upon us
to explain and understand human behavior as essentially
meaningful.

But while human freedom may be theoretically

and methodologically difficult, scientific method and
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inquiry should and can contribute to ongoing dialogue about
human freedom.

This has been precisely Rychlak's point:

Human agency need not and should not evade empirical rigor.
To account for human agency LLT utilizes Aristotle's
well known notion of the four causes: material, efficient,
formal and final.

The material cause refers to the

substance from which something is made.

If we are trying to

demonstrate the causes of chair, to use the classic example,
the wood used to build a chair would be the material cause.
The efficient cause refers to the forces or "energy" by
which something is made.

In the case of our chair, it would

be the physical effort expended in putting the chair
together.

The formal cause refers to the "form" or

"blueprint" belonging to the item being brought about.

In

order for the chair to be made, some idea about what a chair
looks like--its "chairness"--must be known.

The final cause

refers to the intention or "that for the sake of which"
something is brought about.

The chair was made with the

intention of being used to sit on (among other things).

As

might be noticed, Aristotle's notion of cause is much
broader than current notions of cause--established by the
Newtonian world--which generally limit (reduce) themselves
to either material or efficient causes (Rychlak, 1988,
1985)--i.e., the external or internal forces mentioned
above.
Logical Learning Theory offers a distinctive set of
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concepts that challenge traditional notions about the
process of cognition and meaningful human activity.

While

these concepts, in themselves, are not unique, when taken
together they provide a unique and provocative agentive
theory of human activity.

For purposes of this thesis some

key concepts need to be defined:

The mediational process

explanation, the predicational process explanation,
dialectical meaning, oppositionality and telosponse.
When addressing the issue of learning processes,
Rychlak (1988b) makes a distinction between two kinds of
theoretical explanation: mediational theorizing and
predicational theorizing.

The mediational theoretical model

always assumes that "something formed outside [the learning]
process is taken in and comes to play a role in that process
that is not intrinsic to it" (p.118).

That is, the process

mediates for the stimulus, or "input", which is extrinsic to
the process and is the prompting signal for getting the
process "up and running."

The mediational process conveys

rather than creates meaning.

The meaning derived from the

process is contingent and necessary; the process itself
never articulates or forms the meaning, it only plays an
instrumental role in making the proper connection for the
meaning to occur.

This is essentially a description of the

behavioristic stimulus-response model which sees frequency
and contiguity as the sole force (efficient cause) behind
learning.

Many cognitive theories base their explanation of

13

human learning on the same mediational process, only they
are interested in describing the mechanisms that occur
between stimulus and response, but they are necessary
mechanisms nonetheless.
In contrast, the predicational process explanation,
upon which LLT is based, describes a process of learning and
meaning that involves "the act of affirming, denying, or
qualifying broader patterns of meaning in relation to
narrower or targeted patterns of meaning" (ibid., 1988a,
p.119).

It is a top-down process.

For example, when we say

"all men are mortal," mortality is the larger meaning and
man is the narrower or "target" meaning. The act of
predicating also establishes a context, as in the major
premise of a syllogism, which extends meaning to the minor
premises and conclusion.
This is not to say that predication is tied exclusively
to syntax and grammar; predication is essentially a semantic
process, with meaning being fundamental.

Meaning is

patterned organization, symbolizing intention.

The

predicational process places the predicator at center stage,
allowing for the meaning to be created by the process not
something extrinsic to it.

Since in a mediational process

the process itself never articulates or forms meaning,
something like predication could only be secondary and
essentially mechanistic, as in some cognitive theories.
Thus, after taking in "men" and "mortality" and a few other

14

connecting words like "all" and "are," the mediational
process can combine--through frequency and contiguity--word
units into the sentence "all men are mortal."

The main

point is that the predication process sees the agent as the
creator of meaning and the mediational process sees stimuli
or inputs as the source for the illusion of meaning.

The

person is active in the predicational process and passive in
the mediational.
It is here that our above discussion of theory and
assumptions is pertinent.

Since scientific knowledge grows

only as fast as theories are able to generate and nurture
that knowledge, whether the fruits of such knowledge are
bitter or sweet depend, ultimately, on the bitter or sweet
potential of its theoretical-assumptive roots.

For the

mediational theorist, the person is a conveyer rather a
creator of meaning.

Conversely, the predicational theorist

takes the person to be the active contributor of meaning.
These two mutually exclusive assumptions about human beings
form the roots of two very different trees of scientific
knowledge.

Logical learning theory maintains that the

predicational model of human learning is worth nurturing
through empirical cultivation because it can potentially
yield a rich body of knowledge that affirms human agency.
In the remainder of this chapter and the following chapter,
we will attempt to further elucidate those aspects of the
predicational process of learning that are of particular

15

relevance to research conducted for this thesis.

Dialectical Oppositionality
The seminal idea of predication came from Aristotle's
work, employing his notion of formal and final causation.
Logical Learning Theory employs dialectical reasoning to
account for both the formal and final cause contribution of
the person to his or her behavior.

For human action to be

meaningful in any real sense the action must be ''that, as
opposed to this, for the sake of which"; human activity must
have purpose rather than merely being a "response" to
stimuli.

Since dialectics has a long philosophical history,

as well as a long list of different meanings (see Georgoudi,
1983; Reese, 1982; Rychlak, 1976), it is important to
clarify what aspects of the dialectical tradition LLT
employs.
Originally dialectics, derived from the Greek adjective
dialektikos, meant conversation or discussion (see the

Oxford English Dictionary) .

This particular meaning is

still retained in at least one contemporary sense which
refers to idea of debate or argumentation.

Throughout the

history of Western philosophy, dialectics has taken on many
forms.

For some preSocrates (e.g., Anaximander, Parmenides,

Zeno and Heraclitus), Plato's Socrates, dialectics meant a
method for ascertaining truth through the analysis or
reconciliation of apparent oppositions or contradictions of
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reality (Reese, 1982, p. 424)

.

Later, Aristotle

distinguished between demonstrative and dialectical inquiry
or reasoning; the former referring to the kind of
syllogistic reasoning that begins with "primitive" or
primary and true premises and the latter referring to
syllogistic reasoning that uses as its starting point
generally accepted opinions.

Aristotle held that

dialectical inquiry or reasoning is "a process of criticism
wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries"
(Runes, 1983, pp. 94-95).
Both Medieval (e.g., Augustine and Aquinas) and Modern
philosophers such as Kant, Hegel and Marx all include, to
varying degrees, the idea of dialectics, though each
philosopher tends to use the term in very different ways.
Kant uses the term to describe that part of his philosophy
which critically analyzes the difficult attempt to apply the
categories of understanding beyond the objectified realm of
time and space to transcendental realm of antinomies,
paralogisms and ideas.

For Hegel, of course, dialectical

idealism refers to ongoing thesis-antithesis-synthesis
transformations which are teleological in nature.

Marx's

dialectical materialism, while still interested in
opposition or negation (thesis-antithesis), locates this
process in materialism or historical materialism eschewing
Hegel's ontological idealism and, in most senses, his
teleology.
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While we have only touched briefly on the variety of
meanings associated with dialectics in Western thought [the
dialectic is ever present in most Eastern philosophies as
well; see Nakamura (1964) and Kuo (1976)], there are some
common themes, as well as some elaborations, that run
through the history of dialectical meaning.

Georgoudi

(1983), in his review of dialectics, suggests following
commonalities and elaborations: dialectic orientation is
opposed to all metaphysical conceptions that claim
psychological processes, social structures or material
conditions as the primary cause of human activity; it is
usually viewed as a process of relating between elements as
subject and object or consciousness and being; dialectical
relations are founded on negation or contradiction; negation
is dynamic, always in play; it is concerned not with states
of being but the process of becoming; dialectics is
teleological; and finally, dialectical relationships are
grounded on concrete lived experiences and not on reified
abstractions.
Dialectical meaning is the sine qua non of LLT, which
embraces some but not all of the preceding descriptions.
Its interests lie in the human capacity to think and reason
in terms of opposition.

Rychlak (1988a, p.511) describes

dialectical meaning as "meaning in which relations are said
to bear the characteristics of oppositionality, duality,
relationality, contradiction, and arbitrariness."

Logical
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learning theory maintains that many--perhaps all--meanings
are bipolar, and they can be apprehended only in terms of
their opposites.

Note, however, that LLT employs

dialectical meaning to describe the relationship of meanings
within the predication process and is thus part and parcel
of the process (contra other dialectical explanations).
Furthermore,

human beings are by nature capable of dealing

with this oppositionality by creating dialectical
alternatives.

Because of this there is never only a single

cognitive or behavioral alternative available to a person at
any one time.

Agency--or affirming one line of reasoning or

behavioral activity over another--is required within this
theoretical perspective.
The oppositional nature of the dialectic implies that
meaning is, at the very least, bipolar.

For example, if one

is confronted with a list of twenty traffic rules,
immediately one has at the very least forty alternatives,
not to mention a myriad of other alternatives, combinations
and degrees.

Inherent in any meaning is its opposite.

fact, meaning is delimited by it opposite.
uses the term "oppositionality"

6

In

And thus LLT

which encompasses

contrariety (all is X, none is X), contradiction. (all is X,
at least one is not X), negation (All is X, That is an
6

-Since there are a large variety of meanings associated
with the idea of dialectics, in recent years Rychlak has
essentially replaced the term "dialectical meaning" with
"oppositionality" to avoid misunderstanding and confusion
about what he means by dialectics.
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untrue premise) and contrast ("this" versus "that").
contrariety is the most basic concept here, from which the
other three spring.

Oppositionality refers specifically to

the bipolar, or dichotomous, aspects of a continuum of
alternatives in any given situation or context.

It is in

oppositionality that any other alternative is possible.
To better understand how meaning is defined and
delimited by its opposite and how this relates to the
predicational process, it is sometimes helpful to think of
meaning in terms of Euler circles (see Fig. 1).

For

example, if we say that "all men are mortal," we could
represent "mortality" as the larger circle (or broader
pattern of meaning) and "all men'' (the targeted or narrower
meaning) as the smaller circle inside the larger circle.
What is often forgotten is that there in meaning outside the
larger circle ("not morality" or "immortality") that
delimits and thus adds to the meaning of mortality.

We

don't often think of meaning this way because the opposite
or the negation of a particular meaning is usually not
articulated or explicitly understood.

Nevertheless, in any

act of predication the opposite of any meaning is
necessarily implied.

This places oppositionality at center

stage in the predicational process.
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Meaning

Oppositional Meaning
(not mortality)

Broader Meaning
(mortality)

Target Meaning
(men)

Fig. 1

It is tempting as psychologists, inclined to look for
universal categories and their operationalizations, to see
oppositionality as merely content categories of opposing
meanings.

This is essentially how mediational theorist

would view opposites.

A mediational model of learning would
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not include oppositional meanings at the simple, initial
level of stimulus inputs.

As explained earlier, in a

mediational model oppositional meaning could only be present
in learning later when higher order meaning can be formed-that is, after a series of oppositional stimuli can be
paired or encoded or attached together through frequency and
contiguity.

This learning would require, then, that there

be static, universal opposites that form strong associations
through frequency and contiguity.

The key to understanding

oppositionality under this model would essentially involve
constructing a taxonomy of specific meanings and their
opposites.

This, in turn, would require one to ask odd

questions such as, for example, "what thing is the opposite
of red?"

This would be an important question since the

mediational model sees external contents as producing
opposite meanings in a bottom-up fashion.
Conversely, a predicational process of learning put
forth by LLT does not see the accumulation of oppositional
content categories as forming oppositional meaning.

In a

top-down fashion, as stated earlier, the process of framing
or predicating meaning includes oppositional meaning at the
outset.

Oppositionality is immediate, not sequential.

When

a particular meaning is grasped, so is its opposite.
Oppositionality is inherent to the process of creating
meaning and not the contents, which are the products of such
a process.

Opposites are not static because the pro,cess
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creates opposites given particular contexts with particular
contents.
To further illustrate this point, we could say the
opposite of "red" is "not red," or, by contrast, is "green."
If one is watching a basketball game between a team dressed
in red and a team dressed in green, it is easy to see how
one might understand green to be the opposite of red.
Moreover, green might be considered the opposite or red if
one is sitting at a stop light.

Again, however, we might be

tempted to see a particular content within a context as
determining the oppositional meaning.

But this would be

misleading because for any given content within a context
there is, in principle, an infinite number of opposites.
The opposite of a particular content within a context is
produced by the process and not that particular content.
Therefore, LLT would explain green as the opposite of red
within the context of watching a basketball game only
because oppositionality, as part of the predicational
process, always suggests "this" as opposed to "that,"

and

not because we have somehow associated red with green enough
times within this context to see them as opposites.

This

distinction between process and content is essential to
understanding how the predicational process of learning
differs from the mediational process.
In order to explain the process of how an individual
may affirm or embrace one or the other ends of bipolar
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meanings, LLT uses a technical term called the ''telosponse."
Telosponse--as opposed to "response"--refers to "taking on a
meaningful item (e.g., image, word judgmental comparison)
relating to a referent acting as a purpose for the sake of
which behavior is then intended" (Rychlak, 1988b, p.283).
This is to say that humans have an innate mental ability to
choose among alternatives (at the very least oppositions) in
a meaningful way that makes their choosing uniquely theirs
and not merely a product of incoming stimuli.

In everyday

language we would probably ref er to this process as acting
intentionally; and intentional acts, according to LLT, is
what make human agency possible.

For purposes of the

empirical research included in this thesis, however, we have
concerned ourselves strictly with the concept of
oppositionality and not with telosponse per se.
The foregoing is necessarily an abbreviated discussion
of Logical Learning Theory.

For a complete explication the

reader is referred to Rychlak's (1988a) treatment of the
topic.

The purpose of this thesis is to empirically

investigate practical applications of LLT dealing with the
central construct of oppositionality.

Chapter III will

review pervious research that has looked at oppositionality
in learning.

Further definitions, explanations,

distinctions and operationalizations will be made in that
chapter and in other chapters of the thesis.
In summary, LLT involves a predicational process in

24

which a wider framework of meaning is used to endow a
targeted item (or narrower meaning) with additional meaning,
thus establishing a context within which targeted items are
made more meaningful. Since oppositionality is an inherent
part of that process and provides a bipolar framework within
which meaning is apprehended, it stands to reason that if an
oppositional context is used in learning and memory tasks,
it will have a greater facilitatory effect on learning than
a non-oppositional context.

The experiments described in

chapters IV, V, VI are designed to test the validity of this
assertion.

CHAPTER I I I

Literature Review

Because what's present doesn't last,
The opposite of it is past.
Or if you look ahead,
Future's the opposite instead.
Or look around to see what's here,
and absent things will not appear.
There's one more opposite of present
That's really almost too unpleasant:
It is when someone takes away
Something with which you like to play.
--Richard Wilbur
"The concept of opposition," writes Rodney Needham
(1987, p.xi-xii),
is one of the most antique in the history of
disciplined thought, and it is to be discerned in the
most disparate and far-separated forms of civilization.
. . . Opposition would thus seem to be a fundamental
notion and thereby qualified to serve as a basic
predicate in the interpretation of human experience and
its most general modes of representation.
And, indeed, it does appear that almost from the beginning
of our Western philosophical tradition, philosophers have
concerned themselves with opposition in terms of
metaphysics, epistemology and ontology.

As Ogden (1967, p.

21-33) points out, "Heraclitus had described his flux and
Becoming as a union of the opposites, Being and Notbeing;
Xenophanes had represented the amalgamation of one and All
in God as immanent unity of opposites; Parmenides had found
in the reciprocal relation of a series of pairs of opposites
the constitution of the world of Appearance, and Plato made
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the contradiction between this world and that of the
Eternal, the Unchangeable and the Perfect a basis for his
entire Theory of Ideas."

Of course this early Greek concern

with opposites culminated with Aristotle in what Ogden
(ibid.) calls "Aristotle's obsession with the problem
opposition" or what is generally identified as Aristotle's
theory of contrariety (See Anton, 1957; Babin 1940; Ogden,
1967), which was briefly outlined in chapter II.
In chapter II we also mentioned in our discussion of
dialectics later philosophical approaches that embody an
oppositional nature at the most fundamental level.

To be

sure, the great dualisms generated by Western thought, e.g.,
subject/object, absolute/relative, spiritual/physical,
one/many, reason/faith, mind/body, individual/community,
free will/determinism, nature/nurture, are all oppositional
in nature.

Logical Learning Theory would predict such

fundamental dualism or oppositions in our philosophical
tradition because it claims that thought, mentation or
cognition itself is based on oppositionality from the
outset--the "inside" versus "outside" of categorical
reasoning (see Chapter II, Figure 1).

The purpose of this

literature review, however, is not to catalogue the examples
and instances of oppositional thinking from our Western
tradition.

In this chapter, we are interested in reviewing

empirical research that has specifically advanced our
understanding 0£ how oppositionality plays a role in the
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cognitive process itself.

While this genre of research is

relatively new, the reader may find that there is now enough
empirical research dealing with oppositionality to warrant
further empirical verification and exploration in this area.
Linguists have long recognized the importance that
opposition plays in language.

I. A. Richards, for example,

in his introduction to Ogden's (1967) treatise (referred to
above) tells us that the chief principle by which language
works is opposition.

Lyons (1977) explains that "opposition

is one of the most important principles governing the
structure of language" (p. 271).

And Atkinson, Kilby and

Roca (1982) have pointed out that "Pairs of words which are
opposite in meaning are a pervasive feature of the semantic
structure of any language" (p. 181).
Empirical evidence supporting the claim that opposition
plays a fundamental and "pervasive" role in "any" language
has only in recent years found its way into the social
science literature.

For example, Raybeck and Herrmann

(1990), in an ambitious study that looked at eight different
cultures found that when comparing contradictory/
directional, contradictory/ reverse and reverse/directional
semantic relationships (all of which fall under our
definition of opposition) with other forms of synonymic or
associative relationships, the "opposites are the semantic
relations upon which the members of different cultures most
strongly agree" (p.470).

This kind of study substantiates
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Osgood's (1952) procedure of using bipolar or oppositional
meanings to study how widely different cultures make
connotative judgments (see Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957).

oppositionality and Cognitive Development
Not only is there evidence that oppositionality is
culturally universal, there is now concrete evidence
suggesting that the capacity for creating oppositional
meanings or categories begins at a very early age.

Kagan

(1984) informs us that "As the child creates categories, she
is disposed to invent their complement.

Soon after learning

the meaning of up, the child learns the meaning of down;
after learning the meaning of high, she learns the meaning
of low; after good, she develops the meaning of bad. The
appreciation of opposites is comprehended too early and too
easily to be the product of painstaking instruction" (p.
189) .
An example of this kind oppositional comprehension is
Carey's (1978) research from which she has shown that
children, as young as two years old, have the ability to
contrast the meanings of "big" and "little," meanings that
"seem to be acquired at the same time and are mapped onto
the core comparative structure (including polarity)
immediately" (p. 279).

Carey's research clarifies Kagan's

observations by suggesting that children learn the meaning
of "big" and "little" simultaneously and not just "soon

29

after'' as Kagan suggests.

Her research also echos earlier

research conducted by Brewer and Stone (1975) who argued
that at least for spatial meanings, children learn "the
polarity of a dimension before they learn the dimension
itself" (p.306). This clarification is consistent with LLT's
predicational process which suggests that meaning itself is
constructed oppositionally.
In another study involving semantic relationships,
Kreutzer, Leonard & Flavell (1975) interviewed elementary
school children (K, 1, 3, 5) to see how much the children
themselves knew about various memory-related phenomena.
When they were asked about the kinds of semantic
relationships they thought would be easiest to learn, their
responses revealed that with an increase in age came the
tendency to assert that the oppositional meanings are easier
to learn.

Later research conducted by Landis, Herrmann, and

Chaffin (1987) confirmed those assertions when they found
that when comparing the performances of second and eight
grade students who were asked to make judgments about
semantic relations, both the second and eight grader's
judgments about opposites were much more accurate than their
judgments about other semantic relationships.

That

oppositionality or what is sometimes called antonymic
structure is fundamental to the learning process is
underscored by the fact that educators are now advocating
"teaching vocabulary through opposition'' (Powell, 1986).
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The child's natural ability to frame and understand
oppositional meaning is perhaps best illustrated by the
poems found in Richard Wilbur's book entitled Opposites
(1973), one of which introduced this chapter.

Wilbur

explains that the material for the dialectical poems
contained in this book came from a game he and his children
would play in which one member of the family would suggest a
word, and then everyone would join in a lively quarrel about
its proper opposite.
The ability to utilize oppositional meaning has been
found to be associated with creativity, mental health and
maturity.

Rothenberg (1973) conducted an experiment which

demonstrated that subjects who score high on creativity
scales have a stronger tendency to engage in "Janusian
thinking,'' a "capacity to conceive and utilize two or more
opposite or contradictory concepts, images or ideas
simultaneously."

Hogben and Jacobs (1972) found that

schizophrenic subjects tend to "appraise words with similar
sound but dissimilar meaning and words of antithetical
meaning as similar in meaning more frequently than normal
subjects" (p. 296).

And Basseches (1980) reported that

a

content analysis of interviews about the nature of education
conducted with freshman, seniors and faculty members of a
university revealed the faculty members had a significantly
broader range of dialectical schemata than seniors or
freshman, and seniors had a significantly broader
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dialectical schemata than freshman.

oppositionality and Word Association Tasks
As early as 1948, Karwoski and Schachter, through a
series of free association experiments, found that
contrasting words (or words opposite in meaning) were
readily produced, usually faster and more frequently than
words similar in meaning to the stimulus words.

Similar

results were found by Siipola, Walker, and Kolb (1955) when
subjects were asked to produce words in either high pressure
or relaxed conditions.

Kjeldergaard (1962) found, in

another word association task, that subjects', when asked to
do so, could produce equal if not greater numbers of
oppositional words than when asked to give the first
response that came to them.

Carol, Kjeldergaard, and Carton

(1962) also found that oppositional responses are
consistent, independent tendencies in word association
tasks.

This is an important finding since many opposite

responses on standard word-association norms are also
primary responses.
It stands to reason that if oppositionality plays a
prominent role in free association tasks, it is likely that
oppositionality will also play a role in transfer effects or
generalization in learning.

This is indeed the case.

early as 1960, Ryan found that when subjects were given
different types of transfer lists--associated

As
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(oppositional), similar and control--the associated list
produced significantly greater transfer effects than either
similar or control lists, suggesting that oppositional
meaning is

fundamental to semantic organizational patterns.

This finding has been repeatedly confirmed by later
research, utilizing a variety of transfer tasks (Bastian,
1961; Mink, 1963; Weiss-shedd, 1973; Wickens & Chermak,
1967).
A considerable amount of research dealing with the
associative structure of common english adjectives in
particular also points to the prominent role that antonymic
meaning or oppositionality plays in semantic cognitive
patterns.

Reese (1964, 1965) was one of the first to look

at the associative strength and structure of adjectives.
When using a stimulus list that included nearly all common
adjectives in the English language, Reese (1964) found that
"a very considerable portion of the associative meaning of
common English adjectives can be directly described by the
contrast of a polar-opposite scheme" (p.349).

Contemporary

research in semantic memory has also noted the prominent
role bipolar or "marked" antonymic adjectives play in the
organization of meaning (Zagrodzki, 1986; Gross, Fischer, &
Miller, 1989).

After reviewing the relevant literature and

conducting their own experiments that look at the
organization of adjectival meaning, Gross, Fischer, and
Miller (1989) conclude that "predicative adjectives are
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organized in semantic memory in clusters of synonymous (or
nearly synonymous) terms, and that pairs of clusters are
held together conceptually by bipolar attributes whose
opposite ends are labeled by direct antonyms that provide
foci for the clusters" (p. 96).

Moreover, Brewer and

Lichtenstein (1974) have conducted research that calls into
question findings which contend that "unmarked" antonymic
features do not function in the same way that marked
antonymic features do in semantic organizations (see also
Grossmann and Eagle, 1970), suggesting that oppositionality
is truly a semantic rather than simply a syntactic or
lexical feature.

The oppositional nature of adjectival

meaning is of particular interest to us since the
experiments for this thesis require the use of adjectives.
By now it should be obvious that oppositional meaning
is important to the learning and memory process.

It should

be noted, however, that underlying assumptions about how
oppositional or antonymic meaning comes to play an important
role in cognition is fundamentally different for LLT than
for most language and learning theories.

Furthermore, the

theoretical explanation for the findings for many of the
preceding studies does not include oppositionality, nor does
it include the nomenclature we have used to describe LLT and
oppositionality in particular.

For example, Deese (1965)

prefers to treat oppositional findings as manifestations of
similarity or contiguity.

As outlined in chapter II most
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learning theories embrace a mediational model of learning in
which incoming stimuli form the building blocks of semantic
organization or structure in a bottom-up fashion through
frequency and contiguity.

In other words, the contents

(stimuli) determine the semantic relationships established
in learning and memory.

Conversely, a Logical Learning

Theorist would want to argue that the predicational process
forms (requires) oppositional meaning and not the contents
of the process.

Consequently, the theoretical

interpretation and language attached to much of the
preceding evidence for oppositionality would be
fundamentally and substantially different for one
subscribing to the tenets of LLT.

We would argue that the

pervasive evidence for oppositionality is due not solely to
incoming stimuli, but more fundamentally to the predication
process, a process requiring that meaning be framed
oppositionally.
It appears that there is some research which suggests
that the processing of semantic relationships into
oppositional dimensions enhances and perhaps forms the
meaning of any specific semantic relationship.

We have

already called attention to Brewer and Stone's (1975)
finding that little children use the polarity of a dimension
before they learned the particular labels of a dimension.
The work of linguists such Chaffin and Herrmann (1985, 1981)
has shown that in a variety of verbal tasks the semantic
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relationship between words is more crucial to processing
semantic information than the meaning of individual words
themselves (see also Chaffin, Russo, and Hermann, 1981;
Herrmann, Chaffin, Conti, Peters, & Robbins, 1979; Herrmann,
Chaffin, Daniel, & Wool, 1986).

That is to say, the

relationship between antonymic pairs appears to be more
salient than the meaning of the words that form the
antonymic pair.

This is consistent with logical learning

theory's claim that the predicational process is fundamental
to learning specific meanings.

The Utilization of Oppositionality
Several studies have been published in recent years
that directly employ and test the theoretical constructs of
LLT.

A bulk of the research has investigated the

oppositional nature of affective assessment, a special case
of oppositionality.

It is beyond the scope of this

literature review to describe the findings of this
burgeoning area of research.

For a review of this line of

investigation, the reader is referred to Rychlak's (1988a,
Chapter 9) analysis of this important research.

The

remainder of this chapter will describe in some detail three
recent research projects that have tested directly the
utilization of oppositionality in learning tasks without the
added variable of affective assessment.
Hyde and Jenkins (1969) investigated the effects of
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intentional and two types incidental learning tasks on the
recall of highly associated words.

The intentional task

group was presented with a list of words and asked to
remember them for future recall; a semantic task group was
asked to rate the same list of words as to their
pleasantness or unpleasantness (incidental learning); and a
non-semantic task group was asked to look at each word in
the same list for a particular letter (incidental learning).
Those who learned the list either intentionally or
semantically performed equally well in both recalling and
organizing of the stimulus list, and superior to the nonsemantic task group.

Even though Hyde and Jenkins used both

synonym and antonym pairs in this study they did not test
the possibility of effects due to oppositionality.
This is precisely what Williams and Lilly {1985) set
out to do in their investigation of incidental learning.
They conducted two experiments, one of which is of interest
to us.

The relevant experiment was designed to test whether

subjects could recall more antonym pairs than non-antonym
pairs in an intentional and three incidental learning tasks.
After generating a list of 24 words, half of which were
antonym pairs and the other half non-antonym pairs, they
gave the same list to four groups.

Similar to Hyde and

Jenkins, the intentional learning group was instructed to
learn the list for future recall.

Another group of subjects

was instructed to decide whether they liked or disliked each
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word in the list (semantic task).

A third group was asked

to decide whether they thought each word was abstract or
concrete (semantic task).

And a fourth group was instructed

to estimate the number of letters in each word (nonsemantic
task).

Williams and Lilly predicted that subjects would

recall more antonym pairs than non-antonym pairs across
groups.

And in fact, among other results, they did find

that oppositional pairs were recalled significantly better
than nonoppositional pairs for all groups.
In another study Rychlak, Williams and Bugaj (1986)
tested the facilitory effect of oppositionality in learning
male and female names framed from oppositional or
nonoppositional descriptor pairs.

The four oppositional and

nonoppositional pairs were: quiet-outspoken (oppositional),
cautious-bold (oppositional), outspoken-bold
(nonoppositional), and cautious-quiet (nonoppositional).
Rychlak, Williams and Bugaj predicted that subjects would
more readily learn the male and female names that were
framed from an oppositional context than those that were
framed from a nonoppositional context.

As predicted, the

statistical analysis yielded a main effect for
oppositionality, demonstrating that the oppositional
condition facilitated learning better than nonoppositional
condition.
Rychlak, Williams and Bugaj (ibid.) designed a second
experiment that removed word meaning from consideration by
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using consonant-vowel-consonant (CVC) trigrams.

They

essentially turned a paired-associates format into a
triassociation format.

For this experiment two groups of

subjects (one high school students, the other college
freshmen) were asked to learn a series of trigrams by means
of different types predication relationships.

To

illustrate, some subjects were asked to learn four types of
predications for the trigram HIB: HIB is always VIC
(identity), HIB is never QIN (negation), Hib is sometimes
YAT (qualification), and HIB is the opposite of JOQ
(opposition) .

This study is a significant test of

predicational process since the trigrams had no inherent
semantic of syntactic relationship among themselves.
Rychlak, Williams and Bugaj predicted that an oppositional
predication will facilitate learning

eve

trigrams equally as

well as an identity predication and that opposition will be
superior to negation or qualification predications.

As

expected, they found that oppositional predications did as
well or better than identity, negation or qualification
predications, suggesting that oppositionality is in play
even when the word meanings are absent.
Finally, Rychlak, Barnard, Williams and Wollman (1989)
have conducted a series of experiments designed to
demonstrate that subjects can recognize oppositional
patterns in word meanings and sentences, that they can come
to problem solutions by reasoning oppositionally, that
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through practice they can transform sentence meanings
oppositionally, and that they can process oppositional
meanings rapidly and accurately when distinguishing between
opposition and nonoppositional meaning.
In the first experiment, subjects were given 3X5 cards
which had written on them eight words such as: tally,
reject, order, endorse, state approve, help, decline.

Of

the eight words in this example, two (endorse and approve)
are opposites of "reject" and one (decline) is a synonym.
Subjects played a "two-touch" game with the experimenter
which allowed subject to identify either antonyms and
control words or synonyms and control words.

Subjects were

placed in either an antonym vs. control or a synonym vs.
control condition.

Rychlak et al. found that subjects were

just as sensitive to the antonymic patterns as they were to
the synonymic patterns.
In experiment two, the experimenters devised a clever
scenario in which subjects, in order prevent a catastrophe,
had to choose between several different patterns marked by
A's and B's (e.g., AABBAAB), some of which were
oppositional, others reflected a recency or primacy pattern
in relation to the original pattern, and still others had no
recognizable pattern as a control.

It was found that

subjects recognized and utilized the oppositional patterns
as readily as the recency/primacy patterns when compared to
the control patterns.

40

In a third experiment, Rychlak et al. wanted see if
oppositionality would occur in recognizing meaningful
statements and actually increase in facility as a result of
practice.

Subjects were asked to memorize 24 brief

statements (e.g., "the elephant climbed the ladder") and
were assigned to three different conditions that reflected
different ways in which to understand the original
statements.

The three conditions were as follows:

identical ("the elephant climbed the ladder"), paraphrase
("the elephant went up"), and opposite ("the elephant went
down").

The statistical analysis revealed the identical

condition was to easy, but in both the paraphrase and
opposite conditions subjects improved their cognition
steadily with every trial, thus supporting the hypothesis
the oppositional meaning can be recognized in otherwise
meaningful statements and can improve with practice to
facilitate learning.
In the fourth and final study,

Rychlak et al. compared

the accuracy and speed with which subjects could recognize
oppositional or nonoppositional meaning in a meaningful
statement.

To do this, they modified the procedures of the

third experiment by giving subjects a prime sentence (e.g.,
"The ant crushed the rock") followed by either simple or
complex paraphrase statements ("the ant was strong," "the
ant was not weak"), or by simple or complex opposite
statements ("the ant did not crush the rock,"the and was
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weak").

The findings for this experiment revealed that

subjects could, in fact, recognize and respond to
oppositional meanings with accuracy and speed that equalled
or exceeded their recognition of and response to the
paraphrase statements.
In the foregoing, we have tried to build an empirical
case for the presence of oppositionality, as defined by LLT,
in learning tasks.

There is ample evidence to

suggest that

oppositionality figures prominently in cognitive processes.
In this last section of the chapter, we described a small
number experiments that have begun to look directly at how
oppositional meaning might not only be present in learning
but how it might actually facilitate learning.

The

experiments conducted for this thesis were designed to test
and extend in application the facilitory effects of
oppositional meaning to learning tasks that have not yet
been investigated.

Specifically, we wanted to see if

subjects could more readily learn such things as personality
styles and difficult words if given a oppositional
predicational context.

CHAPTER IV
EXPERIMENT I

In order to test our predictions concerning the
relationship between learning and oppositionality we
designed three studies.
same theme.

All three are variations on the

Two of the studies were designed to ascertain

whether subjects could more readily recall personality
descriptors given a semantically oppositional rather than
nonoppositional context.

The third study was designed to

ascertain whether subjects could more readily recall the
definitions of difficult words when those definitions are
learned using an oppositional context verses a
nonoppositional context.

This chapter will describe and

report the results of the first of the two studies involving
personality descriptors.

METHOD

Hypothesis:
Subjects who are asked to learn adjectives describing
the personality styles of faces will require fewer trials to
learn these adjectives when they are presented in an
oppositonal rather than a nonoppositional context.
Rationale: According to LLT, learning involves

predication, in which a wider framework of meaning is
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extended to a targeted item, or narrower meaning (see
chapter II).

Predications always establish a context within

which other items are situated.

The clearer this context is

and the richer it is with meaning, the more readily learning
will take place.

Oppositionality--encompassing contrariety,

contradiction, negation and contrast--provides a wideranging and rich (with meaning) context within which an item
can be situated and hence learned.

Thus, if a subject is

required to associate a face with two personality
descriptors such as "dominant or submissive," he or she will
have a wide-range predication, a broadly framed yet
intrinsically related and meaningful context within which to
situate the face.

The figure depicting Euler circles on p.

20 in Chapter II illustrates this intrinsic relationship.
The direct oppositional relationship of "dominant or
submissive" lends a clearly comparable meaning context to
the targeted face.

Consequently, it should be easier to

recall a particular meaning that is an extension of an
oppositional predication.
In contrast, when a subject has to associate a face
with "dominant or impulsive," the meaning of "impulsive" in
relation to "dominant" lacks a clear relational meaning
context in which to target the face, because the
relationship of "dominant" to "impulsive" adds relative
confusion to the context.
"impulsive" and vice versa.

"Dominant" does not delimit
Consequently, recognizing a
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meaning that is an extension of a nonoppositional context
should prove to be more difficult.

subjects:
Subjects were male and female college students who
participated in the experiment in partial fulfillment of a
course requirement for their introductory psychology class
at Loyola University of Chicago.

A total of forty (N=40)

undergraduate students (18 males, 22 females) participated
in this experiment.

Procedure
Before beginning the experiment, subjects were given a
statement of informed consent to be read and signed (see
appendix A).

This statement emphasized that their

participation was voluntary, that they could withdraw from
the experiment at any time without incurring a penalty, and
that their performance would be kept confidential.

Subjects

were then given specific instructions on how the learning
experiment would proceed.

They were encouraged to ask

questions about the procedure.

Subjects were tested

individually in the same or similar room with comparable
conditions to help avoid random irrelevances in the setting.
To test our hypothesis we arranged for a single subject
to be shown, using a carousel projector, a series of eight
pictures of individual faces flashed on a screen.

Following
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each face, a pair of adjectives that could describe the this
person was shown on the screen (e.g., dominant- submissive
or dominant-impulsive) .

There were four oppositional and

four nonoppositional adjective pairs in each list of eight
faces.

Following each pair of either oppositional or

nonoppositional adjectives, the "correct"

adjective would

appear (e.g., either submissive or impulsive).

Each picture

was followed by a pair of personality descriptors and then
by a single "correct" descriptor.

Each slide (face,

descriptor pair or single "correct" descriptor) appeared in
five-second intervals.
Each subject was told that ''In this study we are trying
to find out how easy it is to learn a person's personality
style or reputation."

The subjects were asked to remember

the ''correct" personality style for the appropriate face.
All subjects were given a practice trial, using three faces
and descriptors not included in the experiment proper, to
familiarize themselves with the procedure.

After the

practice trial, and after subjects had viewed each face and
its accompanying descriptors to be used in the experiment
once (one trial), the subjects were instructed to call out,
from the second trial and thereafter, the "correct"
descriptor before the pair of oppositional or
nonoppositional descriptors appeared on the screen.
Correctly calling out the proper descriptor constituted a
"hit''; and an incorrect response or no response at all
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constituted a ''miss."

Subjects were informed of their hits

and misses, and each hit and miss was simultaneously
recorded on a trial grid sheet for each of the eight faces
across trials.

Subjects completed the experiment by

correctly calling out all eight descriptors for each face
twice in a row in two consecutive trials.

If a subject

accurately anticipated the ''correct" descriptor for all the
pictures in a particular trial but then missed correctly
anticipating at least one descriptor in the following trial,
the subject would then have to correctly anticipate the
descriptors for every picture in the next two trials in
order for the experiment to stop.
After subjects had completed the experiment, they
were given a written debriefing (see appendix B) concerning
the purpose of the experiment.

When the subjects had

finished reading the debriefing, the experimenter took time
to explain any unanswered questions.

The experimenter then

signed the subjects' verification form and they were
dismissed.

Ten subjects were used to pretest experimental

material and procedures.

Materials
The pictures used for this experiment were taken from a
1960s Purdue University yearbook.

All eight slides

consisted of black and white photographs of Caucasian males.
To avoid position effects (e.g., primacy/recency), the faces
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and their accompanying descriptors were arranged in three
different random orders across trials.

The three orders

were repeatedly rotated until the subjects completed the
experiment.
The sixteen descriptors used in this experiment (see
appendix C) were selected from Anderson's (1968)
"likableness ratings of 555 personality words" norms.
Anderson's norms allowed us to control for positive and
negative affective association and the level of ambiguity in
meaning.

The selection process involved choosing equal

numbers of liked and disliked words that had a minimum of
ambiguity.

Eight of the descriptors chosen were among the

top 102 most liked words.

None of these eight words had a

score less than 4.66 on a scale that ranged from 0-6, a
score of 6 being "the most favorable or desirable." The
other eight descriptors (opposite in meaning to the first
eight) were chosen from among the bottom 121 most disliked
words.

None of these eight words had a likableness rating

higher than 1.53 on a scale that ranged from 0-6, a score of

o

being "the least favorable or desirable."

There were

equal numbers (four each) of liked and disliked words
selected for the "correct" descriptors that followed each
pair of semantically oppositional or nonoppositional
descriptors.

For example, a subject would see a face, then

two adjectives such as "polite (or) rude," followed by
"rude" signifying the "correct" descriptor for that
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particular face.

The subject then might see the next face

followed by two adjectives such as "liar (or) neat," which,
in turn, would be followed by "neat," the "correct"
descriptor for that particular face.
From the sixteen descriptors (eight adjectives and
their opposites), two different sets of descriptor pairs and
their correct descriptor were created using all sixteen
words in both oppositional and nonoppositional contexts.
For example, half of the subjects were given "polite (or)
rude" as one pair of descriptors, while the other half were
given "cold (or) polite" and "honest (or) rude" as
descriptor pairs (see appendix D for both sets of descriptor
pairs) .

The same descriptors were used in both oppositional

and nonoppositional contexts to ensure that the words
themselves were not affecting the outcome.

The two list

were randomly administered to subjects.
To determine the oppositionality (antonymic) and
nonoppositionality of the descriptor pairs, the adjectives
were tested against a thesaurus and ratings from three
judges who were college students participating in the
experiment in partial fulfillment of a course requirement
for their introductory psychology class at Loyola University
of Chicago.

The three judges were given a list of

oppositional and nonoppositional adjective pairs, including
the experimental pairs, and asked to rate each pair of
adjectives and indicate whether they thought that each pair
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was opposite in meaning.

Interrater reliability was

determined taking the number of times the three judges
agreed as to the oppositional or nonoppositional nature of
each adjective pair and dividing that number by the number
of opportunities to agree.

This figure was then multiplied

by 100 (see Shaughnessy and Zechmeister (1985, p. 60)).

The

interrater reliability for experimental oppositional and
nonoppositional adjective pairs was 100 percent.

Scoring and Statistical Analysis
This experiment is a 2 (sex) X 2 (predicational
context) mixed model design, with the first variable being
between subjects and the second variable being withinsubjects.

A significant effect for sex was not expected.

The dependent variables of interest were the trials to
criterion scores for oppositionality and nonoppositionality.
The separate scores for oppositionality

and

nonoppositionality were calculated by counting the number of
trials it took each subject to learn all four of these
descriptors in a sublist.

The criterion we use for

determining whether a subject had learned the personality
style for both oppositionally and nonoppositionally framed
descriptors was two consecutive trials of accurately
anticipating the "correct" descriptor.

The number of trials

it took each subject to learn all four of oppositionally and
nonoppositionally framed descriptors constituted the,within-
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lists score for these dependent variables.

Thus, subjects

could have learned the four oppositionally framed
descriptors in fewer trials than the four nonoppositionally
framed descriptors or vice versa; or they could have tied,
learning all eight descriptors in the same number of trials.
The difference between the oppositional and nonoppositional
scores constituted the test of our hypothesis for this
experiment.
To clarify this scoring procedure, if, for example, a
subject correctly anticipated all four oppositionally framed
descriptors in the 5th and 9th trials, reaching criterion on
the 10th, that subject's oppositional score would be 10.
This same subject may have correctly anticipated all
nonoppositionally framed descriptors in the 5th, 9th, 11th
trials, reaching criterion on the 12th, that subject's
nonoppositional score would be 12.
The experimenter was present during the experiment in
order to record hits and misses for each trial, using a
trials to criterion grid sheet.

To ensure the accuracy of

recording hits and misses, the learning session for one out
of every four subjects was audiotaped.
ten audiotaped sessions.

There was a total of

Each taped session was then

compared with its trials to criterion grid sheet for
recording errors.

Of the ten sessions audiotaped, two

errors were found, both inconsequential to the score of the
particular subject.

(The recording errors were made in early
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trials in which neither oppositionally or nonoppositionally
framed descriptors were learned.)

Also, the audio recording

for one session helped clarify a recording mark which had no
bearing on the score of the subject.

Since the audiotaped

sessions revealed so few recording errors, we can assume
that the overall recording error rate was minimal and was
inconsequential to the outcome of the experiment.
The analysis of the data for this experiment was a
factorial analysis of variance using the BMDP2V statistical
program.

RESULTS
The hypothesis for this experiment predicted subjects
will require fewer trials to learn the oppositionally framed
descriptors than the nonoppositionally framed descriptors.
In order to test this hypothesis, a two-way analysis of
variance (sex by predicational context) was performed,
comparing the number of trials it took each subject to learn
oppositionally and nonoppositionally framed descriptors.
The analysis produced a marginally significant main effect
for oppositionality, F(l, 38)= 3.81, p=.0583.
a main effect for sex.
and semantic context.

There was not

There was no interaction between sex
Table 1 contains the means and

standard deviations for this analysis.
ANOVA source table for this analysis.

Table 2 contains the
The complete set of

raw data for this experiment can be found in appendix E.
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Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations for Sex and Trials to
Criterion Scores

Male

Female

Total

-----------------------------------------------------------oppositional
8.00
9.50
8.83
(SD)

(2.03)

(3. 02)

nonoppositional
(SD)

8.83
( 2. 04)

9.60
(3.23)

total
(SD)

8.42
(2.04)

9.55
(3.13)

(2.53)
9.25
(2.64)

Table 2
Analysis of Variance for Sex and Trials to Criterion Scores

Source of Variance

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

SEX
ERROR

25.23
509.16

1
38

25.23
13.40

1. 88

.1781

1
1
38

4.23
2.73
1.11

3.81
2.46

.0583
.1251

OPPOSITION
SEX/OPPOSITION
ERROR

4.23
2.73
42.154

F

p
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Conclusion
since the extant literature on oppositionality,
summarized in chapter III, establishes a precedent for
oppositional effects in learning, we can, with some
confidence (our hypothesis could have employed a one-tailed
prediction), reject the null hypothesis of "no differences"
between oppositionality and nonoppositionality.
A marginally significant effect for oppositionality was
found in this trials-to-criterion learning task.

Chapter V

will describe and report the results of a similar
experiment, only this time we will see if oppositionality
facilitates learning in a one-shot recall learning task.

CHAPTER V
EXPERIMENT 2

Experiment 1 was designed to test our hypothesis that
oppositionality facilitates learning in a trials to
criterion recall task.

Experiment 2 is designed to test the

hypothesis that oppositionality facilitates learning in a
one-shot recall task which, again, involved learning
personality styles.

This chapter will describe and report

the results of that experiment.

METHOD

Hypothesis:
Subjects who are asked to select adjectives describing
the personality styles of faces will recall more of the
adjectives when they are initially presented in an
oppositional rather than a nonoppositional context.
Rationale: The rationale is essentially the same as in
experiment 1.

If a subject is required to associate a face

with two personality descriptors such as "dominant or
submissive," he or she will have a wide-range predication, a
broadly framed yet intrinsically related and meaningful
context within which to situate the face.

The direct

oppositional relationship of ''dominant or submissive" lends
a clearly comparable meaning context to the targeted face.
54

55

consequently, it should be easier to recall a particular
meaning that is an extension of an oppositional predication.
In contrast, when a subject has to associate a face
with "dominant or impulsive," the meaning of "impulsive" in
relation to "dominant" will more often than not lack a clear
relational meaning context to the face because the
relationship of "dominant" to "impulsive" adds relative
confusion to the context becasue these meanings do not
enrich each other.

Consequently recalling a meaning that is

an extension of a nonoppositional context should prove to be
more difficult.

Subjects:
Subjects were male and female college students who
participated in the experiment in partial fulfillment of a
course requirement for their introductory psychology class
at Loyola University of Chicago.

A total of sixty (N=60)

undergraduate students (23 males, 37 females) participated
in this experiment.

Procedures
The same informed consent procedures were followed as
in experiment 1 (see Appendix A).

Subjects were then given

specific instruction on how the learning experiment would
proceed.
procedure.

They were encouraged to ask questions about the
Subjects were tested in the same or similar room
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with comparable conditions to help avoid random irrelevances
in the setting.
To test our hypothesis we arranged for small groups of
subjects (3-4 per group) to be shown a series of twelve
pictures of individual faces flashed on a screen by a
carousel projector.

Following each face, a pair of

adjectives--six oppositional and six nonoppositional in
relation to each other--that could describe the personality
style of the preceding person was shown on the screen (e.g.,
dominant-submissive or dominant-impulsive). Each picture was
followed by one of these pairs of personality descriptors.
Each slide (both face and descriptor pair) appeared in tensecond intervals.
A subject was told that in this study we were trying to
find out how easy it was to learn a person's personality
style or reputation.

The subjects were asked to choose one

of the two adjectives they thought would best fit the
personality style of the preceding picture and then write
that adjective down on a sheet of paper provided for them.
They were then told that later in the experiment they would
be asked to remember the adjectives they chose.

All

subjects were given a practice trial, using three faces and
descriptors not included in the experiment proper, to
familiarize themselves with the procedure.

Following the

practice trial, the subjects were given twelve faces each
accompanied by either two oppositional or nonoppositional
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personality descriptors.

This was a one-shot learning task.

After the subjects had completed the trial and had
written down the twelve descriptors of their choosing, the
sheets with their chosen descriptors were gathered.

The

subjects were then given another sheet and instructed that
the same twelve pictures, without the pair of descriptors,
would be shown to them again in a different order.

The

subjects were asked to write in the blanks provided on the
sheet the personality styles that they chose for each of the
faces they were about to be shown.

Subjects were instructed

to fill in as many blanks as they could, and to put an X on
those blanks in which they could not remember the descriptor
in order to avoid confusion about where to put which
descriptor.

(This procedure also helped avoid confusion

later when attempting to score the sheets.)
After subjects had completed the second trial and had
filled in the second sheet as completely as possible, the
sheets were then gathered and paired with the initial sheet
that the subjects had been given.

After the second sheet

was gathered, each subject was given a written debriefing
(see Appendix B) concerning the purpose of the experiment.
When the subjects had finished reading the debriefing, the
experimenter took time to explain any unanswered questions.
The experimenter then signed the subjects' verification form
and they were dismissed.

Four subjects were used to pretest

experimental material and procedures.
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Materials
As in experiment 1, the pictures used for this
experiment were taken from a 1960s Purdue University
yearbook.

All twelve slides consisted of black and white

photographs of Caucasian males.
The twenty-four descriptors used in this experiment
(see appendix F} were selected from Anderson's (1968}
"likableness ratings of 555 personality words'' norms.
Again, Anderson's norms allowed us to control for positive
and negative affective association and the level of
ambiguity in word meaning.

The selection process involved

choosing equal numbers of liked and disliked words that had
a minimum of ambiguity.

Eight of the descriptors chosen

were among the top 149 most liked words.

None of these

eight words had a score less than 4.29 on a scale that
ranged from 0-6, a score of 6 being "the most favorable or
desirable." The other eight descriptors (opposite in meaning
to the first eight} were chosen from among the bottom 233
most disliked words.

None of these eight words had a

likableness rating higher than 2.24 on a scale that ranged
from 0-6, a score of O being "the least favorable or
desirable."
Using the twenty-four descriptors (twelve adjectives
and their opposites}, two different sets of descriptor pairs
were created using all twenty-four words in both
oppositional and nonoppositional contexts.

For example,
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half of the subjects were given "polite (or) rude" as one
pair of descriptors, while the other half were given "polite
(or) boring" and "sincere (or) rude" as descriptor pairs
(see appendix G for both sets of descriptor pairs).

The

same descriptors were used in both oppositional and
nonoppositional contexts to ensure that the words themselves
were not affecting the outcome.

The two lists were randomly

administered to subjects.
To determine the oppositionality and nonoppositionality
of the descriptor pairs, the adjectives were tested against
a thesaurus and ratings from three judges who were college
students participating in the experiment in partial
fulfillment of a course requirement for their introductory
psychology class at Loyola University of Chicago.

The three

judges were given a list of oppositional and nonoppositional
adjective pairs, including the experimental pairs, and asked
to rate each pair of adjectives and indicate whether or not
they thought that each pair was opposite in meaning.
Interrater reliability was determined taking the number of
times the three judges agreed as to the oppositional or
nonoppositional nature of each adjective pair and dividing
that number by the number of opportunities to agree.

This

figure was then multiplied by 100 (see Shaughnessy and
Zechmeister [1985, p. 60)).

The interrater reliability for

experimental oppositional and nonoppositional adjective
pairs was 100 percent.
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Scoring and Statistical Analysis
As with experiment 1, this experiment is a 2 (sex) X 2
(predicational context) mixed model design, with the first
variable being between subjects and the second variable
being within-subjects.
expected.

A significant effect for sex was not

The dependent variables of interest were the

scores for oppositionality and nonoppositionality.

The

score for oppositionality was calculated by counting the
number of correctly recalled descriptors that had been
originally framed from an oppositional context for each
subject.

The same scoring procedure was used for

nonoppositionally framed descriptors.

For each subject, the

number of recalled descriptors that had been originally
framed from a nonoppositional context constituted the score
for nonoppositionality.

Thus, subjects could have recalled

more oppositionally framed descriptors than
nonoppositionally framed descriptors, or vice versa; or they
could have tied, recalling equal numbers of oppositionally
and nonoppositionally framed descriptors.

The mean

difference between the oppositional and nonoppositional
scores constituted the test of our hypothesis for this
experiment.

The analysis of the data for this experiment

was a factorial analysis of variance using the BMDP2V
statistical program.
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RESULTS

The hypothesis for this experiment predicted that
subjects will recall more of the oppositionally framed
descriptors than the nonoppositionally framed descriptors.
The two-way factorial analysis of variance produced a
significant main effect for predicational context, F(l, 58)=
5.03, p=.0288.

There was no main effect for sex.

There was

no interaction between sex and predicational context.

Table

3 contains the means and standard deviations for this
analysis.

Table 4 contains the ANOVA source table for this

analysis.

The complete set of raw data for this experiment

can be found in appendix H.
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Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations for Sex and Trials to
. Criterion Scores

Male

Female

Total

(1.35)

(1.76}

( 1. 56)

nonoppositional
(SD)

1. 61
(1.23)

1. 81
(1.17}

1. 73
(1.20)

total
(SD}

1.91
(1.29}

2.04
(1.46)

----------------------------------------------------------2.27
2.25
oppositional
2.21
(SD)

Table 4
Analysis of Variance for Sex and Recall Scores

Source of Variance

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

F

p

----------------------------------------------------------0.46
.6648
SEX
0.46
.19
1
ERROR
OPPOSITION
SEX/OPPOSITION
ERROR

141. 03

58

2.43

8.09
0.16
93.33

1
1
58

8.09
0.16
1. 61

5.03
.10

.0288
.7552
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conclusion
Since a significant effect for oppositionality was
found we can reject the null hypothesis suggesting "no
differences" between our experimental conditions.
Since a marginally significant effect for
oppositionality was found in the trials to criterion recall
task (Experiment 1) and an unqualified significant effect
was found in this one-shot recall task, it seemed plausible
to us that oppositionality may facilitate learning in yet
other types of learning tasks which heretofore had not been
studied.

Chapter VI will describe and report the results of

another experiment designed to extend and test our
hypothesis that oppositionality facilitates learning.

CHAPTER VI
EXPERIMENT 3

Experiment 1 and 2 were designed to test our hypothesis
that oppositionality facilitates learning in trials to
criterion and one-shot recall tasks.

Experiment 3 is

designed to test, again, the hypothesis that oppositionality
facilitates learning in a trials to criterion learning task
which involves learning the definitions of difficult words.
This chapter will describe and report the results of that
experiment.

METHOD

Hypothesis:
Subjects who are asked to learn the defintions of
difficult words will require fewer trials to learn these
definitions when they are presented in an oppositonal rather
than a nonoppositional context.
Rationale: The rationale is essentially the same as in

experiments 1 and 2.

If a subject is required to associate

a difficult word with two possible definitions that are
antonymically related, such as ''fancy or plain," he or she
will have a wide-range predication, a broadly framed yet
intrinsically related and meaningful context within which to
situate the word.

The direct oppositional relationship of
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"fancy or plain" lends a clearly comparable meaning context
to the targeted difficult word.

Consequently, it should be

easier to recall a particular meaning that is an extension
of an oppositional predication.
In contrast, when a subject has to associate a word
with "genial or fancy," the meaning of "genial" in relation
to "fancy" will more often than not lack a clear relational
meaning context to the difficult word because the
relationship of "fancy" to "genial" adds relative confusion
to the context because these meanings do not delimit each
other.

Consequently recalling a meaning that is an

extension of a nonoppositional context should prove to be
more difficult.

Subjects:
Subjects were male and female college students who
participated in the experiment in partial fulfillment of a
course requirement for their introductory psychology class
at Loyola University of Chicago.

A total of sixty (N=60)

undergraduate students (17 males, 43 females) participated
in this experiment.

Procedures
The same informed consent procedures were followed as
in experiment 1 (see Appendix A).

After consent forms were

signed, subjects were then given specific instructions on
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how the learning experiment would proceed.

They were

encouraged to ask questions about the procedure.

Subjects

were tested individually in the same or similar room with
comparable conditions to help avoid random irrelevances in
the setting.
To test our hypothesis we arranged for each subject to
be shown, using a standard memory drum, a series of eight
difficult words.

Following each difficult word, a pair of

one-word definitions appeared in the memory drum window.
One of the words was a synonym for the difficult word.

The

other word in the pair was either an antonym (opposite in
meaning) or another word that was neither a synonym or
antonym.

For example, if the difficult word "recherche"

appeared in the window, a pair of words, either "fancyplain" (oppositional) or "genial-fancy" (nonoppositional),
would next appear in the window.

There were four

oppositional and four nonoppositional definitional pairs in
each list of eight difficult words.

Following each pair of

either oppositional or nonoppositional definitional pairs,
the correct definition would appear in the window.

In this

particular example, the word "fancy" would appear in the
window after "fancy-plain" or "genial-fancy."

Each

difficult word was followed by a pair of definitions and
then by the correct definition of the two.

The words

(difficult word, single-word definition pairs and the
correct definition) appeared in the memory drum window at
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four-second intervals.
Each subject was told that "In this study we are trying
to find out how easy it is to learn the meanings of
difficult words."

The subjects were asked to remember the

correct definitions that accompanied the difficult word.
All subjects were given a practice trial, using three
difficult words and their definitional pairs not included in
the experiment proper, to familiarize themselves with the
procedure.

After the practice trial, and after subjects had

viewed each difficult word and its accompanying definitions
to be used in the experiment once (one trial), the subjects
were instructed to call out, from the second trial and
thereafter, the correct definition before the pair of
oppositional or nonoppositional definitions appeared in the
window.

Correctly calling out the proper meaning

constituted a "hit"; and an incorrect response or no
response at all constituted a "miss."
Subjects were informed of their hits and misses, and
each hit and miss was simultaneously recorded on a trial
grid sheet for each of the eight faces across trials.
Subjects completed the experiment by correctly calling out
all eight definitions twice in a row in two consecutive
trials.

If a subject accurately anticipated the correct

definition for all the difficult words in a particular trial
but then missed correctly anticipating at least one
definition in the following trial, the subject would then
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have to correctly anticipate the definitions for every
difficult word in the next two trials in order for the
experiment to stop.
After subjects had completed the experiment, they
were given a written debriefing (see appendix I) concerning
the purpose of the experiment.

When the subjects had

finished reading the debriefing, the experimenter took time
to explain any unanswered questions.

The experimenter then

signed the subjects' verification form and they were
dismissed.

Ten subjects were used to pretest experimental

material and procedures.

Materials
The eight difficult words used in this experiment (see
appendix J) were selected from a dictionary.

The one-word

definitions for each of the eight difficult words were also
derived from a dictionary.

A total of twenty-two words (8

definitions and their opposites and 8 other words) were
generated to provide the oppositional and nonoppositional
meaning context for the difficult words.
From the twenty-two definitions, two different sets of
definitional pairs were created.

For example, as

illustrated in the procedure section, for half of the
subjects the difficult word "recherche," was followed by the
definitional pair "fancy (or) plain,"

while for the other

half "genial (or) fancy," followed "recherche" {see -appendix
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K for both sets of definitional pairs).

The two lists were

randomly administered to subjects.
To determine the oppositionality (antonymical) and
nonoppositionality of the definitional pairs, the meanings
were tested against a standard thesaurus and ratings from
three judges who were college students participating in the
experiment in partial fulfillment of a course requirement
for their introductory psychology class at Loyola University
of Chicago.

The three judges were given a list of

oppositional and nonoppositional one-word definition pairs,
including the experimental pairs, and asked to rate each
pair of meanings and indicate whether or not they thought
that each pair was opposite in meaning.

Interrater

reliability was determined taking the number of times the
three judges agreed as to the oppositional or
nonoppositional nature of each definitional pair and
dividing that number by the number of opportunities to
agree.

This figure was then multiplied by 100 (see

Shaughnessy and Zechmeister [1985, p. 60]).

The interrater

reliability for experimental oppositional and
nonoppositional definitional pairs was .75.

Scoring and Statistical Analysis
Like experiments 1 and 2, this is a 2 (sex) X 2
(predicational context) mixed model design, with the first
variable being between subjects and the second variable
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being within-subjects.
expected.

A significant effect for sex was not

The dependent variables of interest were the

trials to criterion scores for oppositionality and
nonoppositionality.
The score for oppositionality was calculated by
counting the number of trials it took each subject to learn
all four oppositionally framed definitions.

The criterion

we use for determining whether a subject had learned the
definition of each difficult word for both oppositionally
and nonoppositionally framed definitions was two consecutive
trials of accurately anticipating the correct definition.
The same scoring procedure was used for nonoppositionality
framed definitions.

The number of trials it took each

subject to learn all four nonoppositionally framed
definitions constituted the score for nonoppositionality.
Thus, subjects could have learned the four oppositionally
framed meanings in fewer trials than the four
nonoppositionally framed meanings, or vice versa; or they
could have tied, learning all eight definitions in the same
number of trials.

The difference between the oppositional

and nonoppositional scores constituted the test of our hypothesis for this experiment.
To clarify this scoring procedure, if, for example, a
subject correctly anticipated all four oppositionally framed
definitions in the 5th and 9th trials, reaching criterion on
the 10th, that subject's oppositional score would be" 10.
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This same subject may have correctly anticipated all
nonoppositionally framed definitions in the 5th, 9th, 11th
trials, reaching criterion on the 12th, that subject's
nonoppositional score would be 12.
The experimenter recorded the hits and misses for each
trial, using a trials to criterion grid sheet.

since the

audiotaped recordings for experiment 1 revealed that the
hits and misses recording procedure was virtually errorless,
we did not tape any of the learning sessions for this
experiment.

The analysis of the data for this experiment

was a factorial analysis of variance using the BMDP2V
statistical program.

RESULTS

The hypothesis for this experiment predicted subjects
will require fewer trials to learn the oppositionally framed
definitions than the nonoppositionally framed definitions.
The two-way factorial analysis of variance did not produce a
significant effect for predicational context, F(1, 58)=1.86,
p=.1783.

There was no main effect for sex.

Table 5

contains the means and standard deviations for this
analysis.

Table 6 contains the ANOVA source table for this

analysis.

The complete set of raw data for this experiment

can be found in appendix L.
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Table 5
Means and standard Deviations for Sex and Trials to
Criterion Scores

Male

Female

Total

opposition
(SD)

8.06
(2.49)

8.12
(2.94)

8.10
(2.72)

nonoppositional
(SD)

8.59
(2.72)

8.42
(3.58)

8.47
( 3 • 15)

total
(SD)

8.32
(2.61)

8.27
(3.26)

Table 6
Analysis of Variance for Sex and Recall Scores

Source of Variance

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square

F

p

----------------------------------------------------------1
.oo
0.08
0.08
.9467

SEX
ERROR

986.29

58

17.01

OPPOSITION
SEX/OPPOSITION
ERROR

4.21
0.31
131. 65

1
1
58

4.21
0.31
2.27

1. 86
.14

.1783
• 7112
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While the mean difference of scores for this experiment
did favor oppositionality (albeit nonsignificantly), the
above results were somewhat surprising since, at face-value,
the raw data scores revealed that considerably more subjects
learned the oppositionally framed words faster than subjects
who learned nonoppositionally framed words faster.

Of the

60 subjects, 31 (52%) learned the oppositionally framed
words faster; 14 {23%) learned the nonoppositionally framed
words faster; and, 15 (25%) tied, learning both
oppositionally and nonoppositionally framed words in the
same number of trials.
Because there was a mean difference in performance and
it appears that an inordinate number of subjects learned the
oppositionally framed words faster, we have grounds for
conducting a post hoc chi-square statistical analysis to
determine if the inordinate number of subjects learning the
oppositionally framed words faster is significantly
different from the number of subjects who either learned the
nonoppositionally framed words faster or tied.
For the analysis, we simply grouped subjects according
to whether they learned 1) the oppositionally framed words
faster {OPP), 2) the nonoppositionally framed words faster
{NON), or 3) the oppositionally and nonoppositionally framed
words in the same number of trials (TIE) .

Since there were

three possible outcomes, the expected number of subjects for
each group was 20 (see table 7).

The chi-square analysis
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revealed that a significant number (X =9.10, df=2, p<.025)
of subjects learned the oppositionally framed words faster
than those who learned the nonoppositionally framed words
faster or tied.
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Table 7
Chi-square Analysis Expected and Observed Outcomes Diagram
.for Experiment 3

OPP

NON

TIE

Expected

20

20

20

Observed

31

14
( 52%)

15
(23%)

(25%)
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Conclusion
Since the factorial analysis of variance did not yield
a significant effect for predicational context, we are
unable to reject the null hypothesis of ''no differences"
between experimental conditions.

However, the post hoc chi-

square analysis does suggest that oppositionality is
affecting learning for a significant number of subjects.

In

Chapter VII we will discuss the results and implications of
those results for all three experiments.

CHAPTER VII

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The present research has sought to empirically test and
extend the application of oppositionality, an important
construct of LLT, to learning tasks heretofore not studied.
we sought to test whether or not oppositionality can
facilitate learning as it applies to learning personality
styles of faces and difficult words.

In doing so we have

taken seriously the notion that meaning is oppositional.
While the majority of learning theories rely on a
mediational model of learning, our interest was to
demonstrate that human beings, in actuality, learn by means
of predicational process in which meaning is framed
oppositionally.

Since oppositionality is fundamental to the

predicational process, it stands to reason that if people
are given a learning task in which they are able to learn
target items from both an oppositional or nonoppositional
context, a targeted item framed from an oppositional context
should prove to be easier to learn than an item framed from
a nonoppositional context.
In Experiment 1 we hypothesized that subjects will take
fewer trials to learn personality descriptors they have
framed oppositionally than those descriptors they framed
nonoppositionally.

We found a marginally significant main

effect in favor of oppositionality.

The fact that an effect

for oppositionality was only marginally significant may be
77
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due to our procedure for this experiment.

After having

subjects view the faces, the pairs of descriptors (either
oppositional or nonoppositional) in the second flash, and
then the "correct" adjectives in the third flash in the
first trial, we asked subjects to call out the "correct"
descriptor before the second flash in each subsequent trial.
There is the possibility that subjects did not attend to or
consider the pair of descriptors in the second flash because
they knew that the "correct" descriptor would immediately
follow in the third flash.

So essentially after the first

trial, some subjects may have only attended to the faces and
the correct descriptor for each face, effectively preventing
them from framing the faces in either an oppositionally or
nonoppositional predicational context.

If this was indeed

the case then we have no theoretical grounds upon which to
predict that subjects would learn the personality style of
some faces rather than others, and even a marginally
significant effect for oppositionality would be surprising.
It is likely that some subjects did consider the
oppositional and nonoppositional context of the second flash
at least in a number of trials and other subjects rarely
considered the context of the second flash; hence, the
watered down effect for oppositionality.
Our insistence that oppositionality did facilitate
learning in Experiment 1, albeit in a less than ideal
fashion, is justified since Experiment 2 clearly
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demonstrates that oppositionality does facilitate learning
personality styles.

We modified the design of experiment 2

so that subjects would have to consider carefully the
predicational context by only giving them the faces in the
first flash and the oppositional or nonoppositional
descriptors in second flash and then asking them to select
one of the two descriptors they thought fit the preceding
face.

This procedure required subjects to utilize the

predicational context and allowed us to test, unambiguously
and without reservation, whether or not subjects could
recall more self-selected descriptors that were framed
oppositionally.

The results using this procedure yielded a

significant effect for oppositionality.

It is clear that

when subjects are required to carefully consider and perhaps
actively and personally contribute to the predicational
process by selecting from either oppositional or
nonoppositional descriptors, they recall significantly more
descriptors that are framed oppositionally than those that
are framed nonoppositionally.
Since LLT claims that oppositionality is fundamental to
all forms of learning (see Rychlak, 1988a, Rychlak and
Slife, 1984), the results of experiment 3, in which we asked
subjects to learn the definition of difficult words, should
have shown that oppositionality facilitates learning.
though the mean variance between oppositionally and
nonoppositionally framed definitions favored

Even
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oppositionality, the analysis of variance for this
experiment did not yield a main effect for predicational
context.

In light of the procedural problems associated

with experiment 1 discussed above, we should not be
surprised to find no effect for oppositionality since the
procedure for experiment 3 was identical to experiment 1,
only in experiment 3 subjects were asked to learn the
definitions of difficult words rather personality styles of
faces.

Again, subjects could have easily ignored the

predicational context (oppositional or nonoppositional)
provided in the second flash and simply concentrated on the
difficult word and its correct definition which followed the
predicational context for each difficult words in every
trial.
There is, however, evidence that

oppositionality did,

in fact, facilitate learning in this experiment as suggested
by the post hoc chi-square analysis.

That analysis found

that a significant number of subjects (51%) actually learned
more readily oppositionally framed definitions than subjects
who tied (25%) or learned nonoppositionally framed
definitions more readily (24%).

Since for a significant

proportion of the subjects the oppositional context
facilitated learning, it can be argue that this
nonparametric discrepancy is due to the fact that some
subjects, more than others, were actually taking into
consideration the predicational context.
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In addition, there appears to be a list difference for
subjects receiving lists 1 and 2.

While 13 of the 30

subjects who received list 1 learned the nonoppositionally
framed definitions more readily, only 1 out of the 30
subjects who received list 2 learned the nonoppositionally
framed definitions more readily {See appendices Kand L).
It is possible that some difficult words were, regardless of
the predicational context, simply easier to learn, or some
other unforeseen (and, hence, uncontrolled) variable
influenced the difference in outcomes for the two lists.
At any rate, had all subjects taken seriously the
predicational context, the parametric results should have
shown a significant result for oppositionality as was the
case in experiment 2.
Since logical learning theory maintains that it is the
individual person who frames meaning oppositionally and not
some universally law exogenous to the person, the
nonparametric analysis which took into consideration the
outcome of each individual subject should be considered a
legitimate way to test the effect of oppositionality.
Nevertheless, one could revise the procedures for both
experiment 1 and 3 in such way that subjects would have to
more earnestly consider the oppositional and nonoppositional
context.

For example, one could change the procedure so

that both experiments become recognition tasks.

Instead of

asking subjects to call out the correct descriptor or
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definition before the oppositional or nonoppositional
context appears (in the second flash), we could ask subjects
to decide, after the second flash, which one of the two
descriptors or definitions is the correct one.

The third

flash would then signify to the subject whether or not he or
she recognized the correct descriptor or definition.

since

following this procedure would require subject be attentive
to the predicational context, we would, again, hypothesize
that subjects will learn the oppositionally framed
descriptors and definition more readily than the
nonoppositionally framed descriptors and definitions.
Be that as it may, the three experiments described in
this thesis, when taken together, do support LLT's claim
that oppositionality or dialectical thinking is important to
the learning process.

In and of themselves, of course, they

do not demonstrate the breath and depth of oppositionality
as outlined by LLT, but they do provide an useful
operationalization of oppositionality that can be
empirically validated.

Judging by the outcomes of these

three experiments, we strongly recommend that future
research dealing with oppositionality include experimental
designs that require subjects to attend to and actively
contribute to the learning process.
In conclusion, we argued in chapter II that a learning
theory must take into account the agentive nature of human
activity since, in some sense, we generally take our"
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thoughts and actions and the thoughts and actions of others
to be meaningful and not simply effected by efficiently
caused necessity; it should be abundantly clear that a
mediational model of learning fails to render human activity
meaningful.

We have also argued that the oppositional or

dialectical nature of human cognition and behavior has a
long and thoroughly demonstrable tradition in philosophy and
history.

We have also described a sizable amount of

research in learning that illustrates the oppositional or
dialectical nature of the learning process, even though it
is not always identified by its researchers as such.
Rychlak's LLT has set forth a theory of learning that
takes into account both the oppositional nature of mentation
and the agentive quality of human activity.

The research

for this thesis has offered empirical support for tenets of
that theory.

Since LLT represents an alternative to the

many mechanistic theories which either explicitly or
implicitly adhere to a mediational model of learning,
continuing to gather empirical support for it may prove to
be one of the most fruitful lines of research for
psychologists as they attempt to understand human beings.
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Consent Form

Date:

Dear Friend:
Thank you for volunteering to participate in this
research project.
Please know that all of the information that we collect
today is confidential. This means that it will be seen only
by myself and other qualified researchers and will be used
for research purposes alone.
You need not use your own name on the experimental
sheets.
You can substitute a number (in certain cases we
will do this for you) . Rest assured that any data we gather
here today is entirely anonymous. No one will ever know
what you specifically achieved or conveyed here today.
Finally, should you decide at any point to discontinue
your participation in this project, for whatever reason,
please feel free to do so. Though we do not expect that
this will happen, we want you to know that you are free to
leave the study at any point without incurring any kind of
penalty.
Please feel free to ask any questions. Once again,
thank you for participating in this research.

Sincerely,

I have read the above and understand it completely.

~~Signature

Date

Today's
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DEBRIEFING: Learning Personality Styles

In this study we are investigating whether you can
learn more readily the personality style of a person
(picture of a person) if given two opposing adjectives to
choose from rather than two nonopposing adjectives. Since
previous research has shown that when people are presented
with opposite meanings they are better able to remember
those meanings, we wanted to see if the same was true when
one is learning personality styles of someone else. To see
if you are, in fact, better able recall opposite meanings
than nonopposite meanings, we simply compared your ability
to call out the correct descriptor associated with a
particular face and whether that descriptor had initially
included opposite or nonopposite meanings.
This research is based on the work of Professor Joseph
F. Rychlak of our psychology department.
If you would like
to discuss any of this with him or the person conducting
this study, they would be happy to arrange an appointment
with you.
Thank you very much for being a participant in the study.

PLEASE LEAVE THIS SHEET ON YOUR DESK
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Sixteen descriptors for Experiment 1

01.
02.
03.
04.
05.
06.
07.
08.
09.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

warm
cold
sincere
phony
sloppy
neat
kind
cruel
honest
liar
boring
interesting
polite
rude
unreliable
dependable
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Lists of Descriptor Sets for Experiment 1

List 2

List 1
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

s.

polite/rude=rude
interesting/cruel=cruel
unreliable/kind=kind
liar/honest=honest
sincere/boring=sincere
sloppy/neat=sloppy
cold/warm=warm
phony/dependable=phony

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

cold/polite=polite
interesting/boring=boring
kind/cruel=kind
liar/neat=liar
phony/sincere=sincere
warm/sloppy=sloppy
honest/rude=honest
unreliable/dependable=
unreliable
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Raw Data Scores for Experiment 1

Subject
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Q

N

07
11
09
07
07
06
06
06
18
10
06
13
06
06
11
09
09
05
08
05

09
11
10
08
08
05
06
08
20
11
06
11
08
09
13
11
10
06
10
06

M/F

Subject

F
F
F
M
F
F
M
M
F
F
M
F
M
F
M
M
M
M
M

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
20.

F

O=Oppositional Score
N=Nonoppositional Score
M\F=Male or Female

Q

N

11
09
11
11
09
10
10
09
10
08
05
09
12
10
13
10
05
07
10
09

11
08
10
08
13
09
09
07
10
08
06
09
12
12
11
09
04
09
10
09

M/F
F
F
M
F
F
M
M
F
F
F
M
M
F
M
F
F
F
M
F
M
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APPENDIX F
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Twenty-four descriptors for Experiment 2
01.
02.
03.
04.
05.
06.
07.
08.
09.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

selfish
generous
sincere
phony
sloppy
neat
pleasant
obnoxious
honest
liar
boring
interesting
polite
rude
unreliable
dependable
friendly
hostile
sad
happy
unfaithful
loyal
sociable
shy
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Lists of Descriptor Sets for Experiment 2

List 2

List 1
01.
02.
03.
04.
05.
06.
07.
08.
09.
10.
11.
12.

interesting/boring
happy/unfaithful
selfish/sociable
loyal/sad
unreliable/dependable
liar/honest
shy/pleasant
hostile/thoughtful
generous/obnoxious
polite/rude
phony/sincere
sloppy/neat

01.
02.
03.
04.
05.
06.
07.
08.
09.
10.
11.
12.

interesting/phony
happy/sad
selfish/generous
loyal/unfaithful
unreliable/honest
liar/neat
shy/sociable
hostile/friendly
pleasant/obnoxious
polite/boring
sincere/rude
sloppy/dependable
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Raw Data Scores for Experiment 2

Subject

Q

N

M/F

Subject

Q

N

M/F

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

3
4
3
5
2
3
2
3
1
0
5
3
2
2
5
4
2
4
3
2
5
4
5
2
4
5
4
2
4
3

3
2
0
2
2
4
1
2
2
0
1
1
0
1
3
4
0
4
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
2

M
F
M
F
F
F
F
M
F
M
F
F
F
F
M
M
M
F
M
M
M

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

2
1
0
2
2
2
0
4
4
1
0
4
3
2
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
1
0
2
1

1
1
1
4
3
1
1
2
3
0
3
5
1
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
0
0
2
5
1
2
2
2
1
2

M
F
F
M

F

F
M
F
F
F

F
F
M

O=Oppositional Score
N=Nonoppositional Score
M\F=Male or Female

M

F
F
F
F
M

F
F
M

F
F
F
F
M

F
M

F
M
F
F
F
F
M
M
M
M
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DEBRIEFING: Learning Difficult Words

In this study we were testing whether oppositionality
is more likely to facilitate learning than
nonoppositionality.
Some of the words you had to learn were
defined for you in an oppositional context during the second
presentation of words. Others were defined in a
nonoppositional context.
It is our hypothesis that when you learn something in
an oppositional context,
since both ends of the opposition
are important to the meaning of the word you are learning,
you have more information to work with than when you are
trying to learn something in a nonoppositional context.
This is not a simple idea.
For example, we might argue
that if you are given opposite words (on the second
presentation) defining the word you are targeted to learn,
you could become confused by these overlapping meanings and
actually do worse than if you had nonoppositional words to
work with.
This research is based on the work of Professor Joseph
F. Rychlak of our psychology department.
If you would like
to discuss any of this with him or the experimenter, they
would be happy to arrange an appointment with you.
Thank you very much for being a participant in this
study.
If you care to write any comments on this study, as
it applied to you, please use the reverse side of this
sheet.
PLEASE LEAVE THIS SHEET ON YOUR DESK WHEN YOU LEAVE

110

APPENDIX J

111

Eight Difficult Words for Experiment 3
1. prolix

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

recherche
nugatory
apodictic
arnphibolous
protean
jejune
anodyne
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APPENDIX K

113
Lists of Definitional Pairs for Experiment 3

List 1

List 2

Anodyne
1. soothing/helpful=soothing

Anodyne
1. tension/soothing=soothing

Jejune
2. interesting/dull=dull

Jejune
2. dull/merciless=dull

Protean
3. elderly/changing=changing

Protean
3. changing/rigid=changing

Prolix
4. wordy/brief=wordy

Prolix
4. weak/wordy=wordy

Amphibolous
5. doubtful/merciless=doubtful

Amphibolous
5. confident/doubtful=doubtful

Nugatory
6. worthless/distressful=
worthless

Nugatory
6. valuable/worthless=
worthless

Apodictic
7. questionable/certain=
certain

Apodictic
7. certain/helpful=certain

Recherche
8. plain/fancy=fancy

Recherche
8. plain/fancy=fancy
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Raw Data Scores for Experiment 3

Subject
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Q

N

M/F

Subject

12
11
09
11
10
09
06
10
11
06
09
07
06
12
09
08
11
08
05
08
04
10
03
07
11
07
07
06
04
10

11
09
09
09
07
10
08
10
12
02
06
08
07
08
07
05
12
04
06
06
04
10
04
07
12
09
04
07
05
06

M
F
F
F
F
F
M

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

F

F
F
M
M
M
F
M
F
F
F
F
F

F
F

F
F

F
M
F
F
M
F

O=Oppositional Score
N=Nonoppositional Score
M\F=Male or Female

Q

N

M/F

09
07
10
07
08
07
05
05
10
08
09
14
14
08
09
07
13
07
04
04
06
09
04
07
09
03
08
08
04
14

10
07
10
09
15
07
07
06
10
08
09
16
14
12
05
09
15
08
04
05
10
11
05
07
10
04
08
10
07
18

M
F
M
F

F
F

F
F

M
M
F
F

F
M
M
F
M
F
F
F
M
F
M
F
F
F
F
F
F
F
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